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Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental
disorder characterised by a lack of social reciprocity and
qualitative impairment in communication, and restricted,
repetitive behaviours and interests.1 Cognitive impairments have
been hypothesised to underlie the surface features of behaviour.
Individuals with ASD have difficulty recognising emotions2
(although see Jones et al3) and understanding the mental states
of others, also known as theory of mind,4 both of which are
thought to contribute to problems in social functioning. Executive
dysfunction is also reported in individuals with ASD, and may
underlie restrictive and repetitive symptoms. Impairments occur
on tasks of planning, response selection/monitoring and
inhibition of pre-potent response in children5 and adolescents,6
as well as reduced cognitive flexibility.7 With regard to common
coexisting behavioural problems, individuals with ASD are at
higher risk of co-occurring psychopathology.8–10 Individuals with
ASD display increased antisocial and aggressive behaviour as
children11 and oppositional defiant disorder as adolescents.10
Children presenting with both ASD and oppositional defiant
disorder have a more severe pattern of psychiatric symptoms than
those without oppositional defiant disorder, with increased
symptoms of generalised anxiety, mania, major depressive
disorder and perseverative behaviours, in addition to more
conduct problems.12
Within the heterogeneous presentation of conduct disorder in
individuals without ASD, a distinct subgroup with a more severe
and stable pattern of antisocial behaviour has been designated as
having callous–unemotional traits.13 This subgroup has a distinct
affective and interpersonal style, including a lack of empathy, an
absence of remorse and a tendency to use others for personal
gain.13 Callous–unemotional traits in youth are a juvenile precursor
of, and conceptually similar to, psychopathy.13 Underlying cognitive
and affective processing difficulties have been proposed to underlie
atypical social functioning in individuals with callous–unemotional
traits. Adolescents with psychopathic traits14 and children with
high callous–unemotional trait scores15 have difficulties in the
recognition of fearful faces. This inability to recognise inter-
personal signals of distress has been postulated to underlie atypical
empathic development.16 Robust and well-replicated associations
between psychopathy and executive dysfunction are also
reported,17 including difficulties with cognitive flexibility,
attentional switching18 and response reversal.19 The explanatory
role of attention–deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
symptoms in the association between executive functioning and
callous–unemotional traits is not well understood; controlling
for ADHD has been reported to eradicate the relationship between
executive functioning and delinquency in adolescents.20
Individuals with ASD and those with callous–unemotional traits
can sometimes present similarly, at least on a superficial level,
yet this may be as a result of different aetiological processes.
Despite phenotypic similarity, twin studies report largely
independent genetic influences (an overlap of 0.43) on autistic
and psychopathic traits.21 Comparative studies have suggested
that callous–unemotional traits are associated with a selective
impairment in affective domains (for example the ability to care
about another’s feelings), whereas cognitive domains (for example
the ability to understand what another is thinking; theory of
mind) remain unaffected.22–24 Conversely, individuals with ASD
appear to have difficulties in cognitive, but not affective, aspects of
interpersonal tasks.4,22–24 Recent neuroimaging studies comparing
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Background
People with callous–unemotional traits and also those with
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) display sociocognitive
difficulties. However, the frequency and neurocognitive
correlates of callous–unemotional traits within individuals
with ASD are unknown.
Aims
To determine the prevalence of callous–unemotional traits in
individuals with ASD and test their association with
behavioural and cognitive measures.
Method
Parents of 92 adolescents with ASD completed the Antisocial
Processes Screening Device (APSD) for callous–unemotional
traits. Adolescents participated in tasks of emotion
recognition, theory of mind and cognitive flexibility.
Results
In total 51% (n=47) scored above a cut-off expected to
identify the top 6% on the APSD. Of these 17% (n=8) had
concurrent conduct problems. Regression analyses found
callous–unemotional traits were associated with specific
impairment in fear recognition but not with theory of mind or
cognitive flexibility.
Conclusions
Adolescents with ASD show high rates of callous–
unemotional traits but, unlike in the general population,
these are not strongly associated with conduct problems.
The relationship of callous–unemotional traits to impairments
in fear recognition suggests similar affective difficulties as in
individuals with callous–unemotional traits without ASD.
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individuals with callous–unemotional traits and those with ASD
have supported the behavioural findings of distinct patterns of
theory of mind and affective empathy of the two groups.25
Very few studies have examined the profile associated with
callous–unemotional traits within individuals with ASD. Rogers
et al reported that children with ASD and callous–unemotional
traits required a longer latency to recognise sad faces, but were
not impaired in intelligence, response inhibition or cognitive
flexibility.26 Comparison of individuals with ASD who were also
offenders v. non-offenders showed a specific impairment in fear
recognition, yet unimpaired theory of mind and executive
functioning in the offending group.27 These studies suggest that
some individuals with ASD also show callous–unemotional traits,
perhaps as a result of a ‘double-hit’, with the emotional processes
implicated in callous–unemotional being affected, in addition to
the social cognitive difficulties typically present in individuals with
ASD (for example theory of mind impairment). However, whether
these findings hold in larger, population-based samples remains
unexplored. Individuals with this ‘double-hit’ of ASD and
callous–unemotional traits may be a complex yet relatively
common presentation within clinics caring for young people with
ASD and additional mental health problems, and thus require
further study. Previous research on callous–unemotional traits
in people with ASD has used selected populations. This paper
extends previous findings by addressing the behavioural and
cognitive correlates of callous–unemotional traits within a
population-based sample of adolescents with ASD. We first
investigate the frequency of callous–unemotional traits in
adolescents with ASD. We test whether the strong association
between these traits and conduct problems reported in the general
population also applies to those with ASD, and describe additional
psychiatric symptoms associated with callous–unemotional traits.
Finally, we test whether a specific impairment in fear recognition
is associated with callous–unemotional traits, as in non-ASD
populations, and explore whether these traits are associated with
difficulties in theory of mind and cognitive functioning.
Method
Participants
A total of 92 adolescents with ASD, who were verbal and had an
IQ 550 had been assessed on the relevant measures as part of
the Special Needs and Autism Project (SNAP) cohort. This cohort
was drawn from 56 946 children living in the South Thames area
of the UK and born between July 1990 and December 1991,
initially as part of an autism prevalence study (see Baird et al28
for further details). The cohort was assessed at age 12 and 16 years.
Assessment at 16 years focused on the cognitive phenotype of ASD
and only those who had estimated IQs 550 at 12 years were
included.29 All received a consensus clinical ICD-1030 ASD
diagnoses made using the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised
(ADI-R)31 and Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic
(ADOS-G)32 at age 12 years. The total number of ICD-10 autism
symptoms was recorded. The study was approved by the South
East Multicentre Research Ethics Committee (REC) (05/MRE01/
67). Written informed consent was obtained from all parents.
Of the participants, 48 met consensus criteria for childhood
autism and 44 for other pervasive developmental disorders
(ICD-10). There were 84 males and 8 females, and the mean age
was 15.5 years (s.d. = 0.5, range 14.7–16.8). Mean Wechsler
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI)33 full scale IQ was 84.7
(s.d. = 17.2, range 50–119).
Parental report, when the participants were aged 12, of car
ownership and housing tenure were used to construct a crude
binary income index (from income differences reported in
MacIntryre et al34) as a family-based measure of deprivation.
Neighbourhood deprivation was measured using the Carstairs
Index, which combines overcrowding, unemployment, proportion
of the population in Registrar General social classes 4 and 5 and
households without a car, with total population UK scores ranging
from75.71 (least deprived) to 16.50, median70.88 (s.d.= 3.41).35
Measures
Behavioural and psychiatric measures
Callous-unemotional (callous–unemotional) traits. The parent-
rated Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD)36 was
completed at 16 years to assess characteristics related to psycho-
pathy. The APSD is a 20-item questionnaire with three underlying
dimensions of psychopathic behaviour: impulsiveness, narcissism
and callous–unemotional traits. The APSD has good internal
consistency, reliability and validity36 and is predictive of later
antisocial outcomes.37 The callous–unemotional dimension is
made up of six items, scored 0 (not at all true), 1 (sometimes true)
or 2 (definitely true): cares about school work, good at keeping
promises, feels bad or guilty when does something wrong,
concerned about others’ feelings, hides feelings from others and
keeps the same friends (items are reverse scored where appropriate).
For binary classification, adolescents who scored six or above
(equal to or above a T-score of 65, comparable to the top 6%)
on the callous–unemotional subscale were identified as having
callous–unemotional traits present.36 Internal consistency of the
callous–unemotional subscale was moderate in our sample
(b=0.59), similar to that reported elsewhere.38 Item response
rates are reported in online supplement DS1.
Behavioural symptoms. The parent-rated Strengths andDifficulties
Questionnaire (SDQ)39 at 16 years was used to measure psychiatric
symptoms. The SDQ comprises three psychiatric subscales of
hyperactivity (ADHD symptoms), conduct and emotional
problems, along with further subscales of peer-relationship
problems and prosocial behaviour. For binary classification, we
used the general population-defined cut-off 54 on the conduct
subscale for ‘definite’ conduct problems.39 Continuous analyses
used the conduct, hyperactivity, emotional, peer problems and
prosocial subscale scores.
Autism severity. Autism severity was measured by dichotomous
diagnostic classification of childhood autism/other pervasive
developmental disorder (for details see Baird et al28). In addition,
clinicians (G.B., T.C. and E.S.) used the diagnostic information
from the ADI-R and ADOS-G to score the 12 ICD-10 symptoms
that comprise the ASD diagnoses (score range 0–12, with a higher
score indicating greater severity). The parent-rated Social
Responsiveness Scale (SRS)40 measured the severity of social
difficulties associated with ASD. The SRS comprises 65 items
providing a total score of autistic traits. This was scored at 12 years
in 60 participants and at 16 years in 27, where data were missing at
12 years.
Neurocognitive measures
Fuller details of the neurocognitive tasks are given in online
supplement DS1. All were administered at 16 years.
Cognitive ability. We measured IQ with the WASI33 generating
full-scale, verbal and performance IQ measures.
Emotion recognition. The Ekman–Friesen test of affect
recognition was used.41 The total number of correct responses
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for each of the six emotions (happy, sad, fear, surprise, anger,
disgust), alongside the total overall score served as the measure
of emotion recognition ability. Data from this task have previously
been reported by SNAP.3
Theory of mind. The Strange Stories task42 was used as a general
measure of mental state understanding. Participants were read a
series of stories, which were also available in front of them and
accompanied by an appropriate illustration. At the end of each
story, they were asked a question about the text. The outcome
variable was the average score across the four theory of mind
stories (score range 0–2, with a higher score indicating better
performance).
The Frith–Happe´ animations43 consist of a series of silent
videos of two-dimensional animations, requiring the participant
to understand intentionality behind the moving shapes. Four
animations depicted theory of mind interactions and two goal-
directed interactions. The outcome variable was the average
intentionality score for the four theory of mind items (score range
0–5). Data from this task have previously been reported by SNAP.44
The Penny Hiding task45 was used as a naturalistic and non-
verbal measure, specifically indexing the participant’s ability to
deceive the experimenter. The participant was given six trials of
hiding the penny. Responses are coded for the type of deception
errors made, with a total score calculated. It was possible to
display more than one error on a trial (score range 0–30).
The Combined False Belief task (designed by Rhonda Booth,
Institute of Psychiatry, see online supplement DS1 for details
of the task) is a combination of first- and second-order false
belief tasks based on previous tasks measuring false belief
understanding.46,47 The two outcome variables were performance
on the first- and second-order parts of the story. If the participant
failed the false belief question then the overall score was
automatically set to zero (score range 0–2 for the first order,
0–3 for the second order false belief task).
The Second-Order False Belief task designed by Bowler was
also included, which has greater verbal demands than the
combined false belief task.47 The outcome variable is whether
the participant is able to understand the second-order false belief.
Participants were awarded one point for passing the false belief
question, and a further point for passing the justification, reality
and memory questions; participants failing one or more of these
questions were awarded a score of 0 (score range 0–2).
Executive functioning. The Card Sort task was used as a measure
of cognitive flexibility and response reversal.48 Participants had to
correctly sort cards to one of three alternative sets across three
trials, with the correct set varying in each trial. The key variable
was the number of sorts required to reach criterion. In the present
analyses, we included only those participants who demonstrated
an understanding of the rule in the first trial by reaching criterion
before the end. The number of sorts required in the second and
third trials was divided into four levels: top half (scores 12–18,
n= 40), third quartile (scores 19–24, n=21), bottom quartile
(scores 25–40, n= 17) and those who did not reach criterion by
the end of both trials (n= 7).
The Trail Making task was included as a measure of attentional
switching and response reversal.49 Participants were asked to ‘join
the dots’ in numerical order, then, in a second trial, in alphabetical
order, followed by a third trial switching between numbers and
letters. The difference between the time taken on the first and
the third trial comprised a measure of switching ability. Because
the data were highly skewed, a square-root transformed score
was used in the present analyses. Data from this task have
previously been reported by SNAP.50
Statistical analysis
All data reduction and statistical analysis were undertaken in Stata
version 11. Descriptive statistics are tabulated by group; however,
as the group above cut-off for both callous–unemotional traits
and conduct problems was small, associations with callous–
unemotional traits were explored using the continuous measure.
In analysing the relationship among behavioural measures,
because of well-recognised cross-domain correlations, any
significant bivariate associations were subsequently covaried for
conduct problems, in order to identify independent relationships
between callous–unemotional traits and behavioural measures.
Associations were also covaried for autism severity, to identify
associations with callous–unemotional traits above those
accounted for by autism severity. The ICD-10 measure was used
as a covariate, as it provides an independent measure in addition
to parent-rated measures of behaviour. Finally, associations
between callous–unemotional traits and performance on the Card
Sort and Trail Making tasks were covaried for hyperactivity
because of previously reported relationships in other samples. In
general, dependent variables were continuous. However, ordinal
logistic regression was used for the four-level Card Sort scale. Both
the emotion recognition task, in which six different emotions were
assessed, and the theory of mind tasks were analysed using
multivariate regression to increase efficiency and reduce type 1
errors from multiple testing. For both analyses, the overall
combined emotion recognition/theory of mind score was first
entered into the regression and subsequently each emotion/theory
of mind task was entered as a separate predictor in the regression
model. Significance of effects was determined from Wald tests
using the robust form of the parameter covariance matrix.
Results
Of the 92 adolescents with ASD, 51% (95% CI 40–61%, n=47)
scored above the designated cut-off for callous–unemotional
traits, expected to identify the top 6% of callous–unemotional
scores in the general population (equivalent to a T-score of 65,
according to the APSD manual36). Within the high callous–
unemotional group (less one participant who was missing SDQ
data), only 17% (8/46) also scored above the conduct problems
threshold, in contrast to 9% (4/45) with low callous–unemotional
scores. These rates of conduct problems were not significantly
different (P= 0.19, Fisher’s exact test).
Table 1 gives the descriptive characteristics for three
groups; those below callous–unemotional (CU) and conduct
problems (CP) threshold, (CU– CP– group, n=41), those above
callous–unemotional but not conduct problems threshold (CU+
CP– group, n= 38) and those above threshold for both callous–
unemotional and conduct problems (CU+ CP+, n=8). The group
with low callous–unemotional and high conduct problems scores
was too small to include (n=4). There were no significant
differences in age, gender ratio, type of ASD diagnosis or
ICD-10 symptom severity among these three groups. The levels
of family and neighbourhood disadvantage were also similar.
However, consistent with the literature on conduct problems in
typically developing adolescents,51 the CU+ CP+ group had a
significantly lower full-scale and verbal, but not performance IQ.
Behavioural symptoms
Regressions assessing the association between callous–
unemotional traits and behavioural symptoms are shown in
Table 2. SDQ subscales of conduct problems, hyperactivity and
peer-relationship problems were all significantly and positively
associated with callous–unemotional traits, whereas prosocial
behaviour was negatively related. When conduct problems were
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accounted for, the associations with peer-relationship problems and
prosocial behaviour remained significant but hyperactivity was no
longer associated with callous–unemotional traits. Emotional
symptoms were unrelated to callous–unemotional traits. The SRS
was strongly and significantly associated with callous–unemotional
traits and this relationship was unaffected by covarying for conduct
problems. When associations were covaried for both conduct
problems and autism severity, associations between peer problems
and prosocial behaviour and callous–unemotional traits remained
significant. Correlations between callous–unemotional traits and
psychiatric and autistic symptoms are displayed in online Table DS1.
Neurocognitive differences among groups
Total emotional recognition and theory of mind task scores by
group are shown in Table 3, together with regressions assessing
the relationship between callous–unemotional traits and task
performance. In line with findings from typically developing
populations, there was no overall association between emotion
recognition and callous–unemotional traits (P=0.21). As predicted,
we identified a specific relationship between higher callous–
unemotional traits and poorer recognition of fear (b=70.30,
P= 0.02). As we hypothesised a priori that fear recognition would
be selectively affected, no corrections for multiple comparisons
were performed. When full-scale IQ was controlled for, the
relationship between callous–unemotional traits and fear
recognition remained significant (b=70.24, P=0.04). No overall
association was found between callous–unemotional traits and
either overall theory of mind (P= 0.73) or with any individual
theory of mind measure.
There was no association between callous–unemotional traits
and cognitive flexibility as measured using the Card Sort (odds
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Table 1 Sample characteristics and behavioural symptoms according to the presence of callous–unemotional traits, as rated by the







Male, n (%) 37 (90.2) 35 (92.1) 7 (87.5) ns
Childhood autism (v. other PDD), n (%) 20 (48.8) 21 (55.3) 5 (62.5) ns
ICD-10 symptom severity,a mean (s.d.) 7.78 (2.24) 8.26 (2.64) 9.38 (2.39) ns
With family disadvantage,b n (%) 5 (15.6) 7 (24.1) 1 (16.7) ns
Neighbourhood deprivation,c mean (s.d.) 71.09 (2.20) 70.58 (2.60) 70.15 (0.81) ns
WASI, mean (s.d.)
Full-scale IQ 85.90 (18.08) 85.45 (17.00) 72.00 (12.07) CU+ CP+ 5CU+ CP–, CU– CP–*
Verbal IQ 81.37 (18.05) 83.00 (17.44) 67.50 (10.84) CU+ CP+ 5CU+ CP–, CU– CP–*
Performance IQ 93.20 (19.37) 90.00 (17.55) 81.25 (13.84) ns
APSD, mean (s.d.)
Total 10.59 (4.28) 14.55 (4.27) 21.75 (6.18) CU+ CP+ 4CU+ CP– 4CU– CP–**
Callous–unemotional 3.63 (1.36) 7.47 (1.29) 8.00 (1.31) CU+ CP+, CU+ CP– 4CU– CP–**
Impulsivity 4.10 (1.77) 4.26 (1.90) 7.13 (2.42) CU+ CP+, CU+ CP– 4CU– CP–**
Narcissism 2.59 (2.26) 2.58 (2.25) 5.50 (3.16) CU+ CP+, CU+ CP– 4CU– CP–**
SQD, mean (s.d.)
Conduct problems 1.32 (1.04) 1.37 (1.02) 5.25 (1.58) CU+ CP+ 4CU+ CP–, CU– CP–**
Hyperactivity 5.56 (2.76) 5.79 (2.32) 7.25 (2.05) ns
Emotional symptoms 3.63 (2.55) 3.34 (2.33) 3.75 (2.31) ns
Peer problems 4.98 (2.38) 5.92 (2.42) 6.25 (2.96) ns
Prosocial behaviourd 6.15 (1.93) 4.22 (2.02) 4.13 (1.89) CU+ CP+, CU+ CP– 5CU– CP–**
SRS total,e mean (s.d.) 83.00 (21.67) 99.57 (20.52) 113.38 (21.00) CU+ CP+, CU+ CP– 4CU– CP–**
APSD, Antisocial Process Screening Device; CP, conduct problems; CU, callous–unemotional traits; ns, non-significant; PDD, pervasive developmental disorder; WASI, Wechsler
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; SDQ Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire; SRS Social Responsiveness Scale;
a. CU– CP–, n=37; CU+ CP–, n= 34.
b. CU– CP–, n=32; CU+ CP–, n=29; CU+ CP+, n= 6.
c. CU– CP–, n=40.
d. CU+ CP–, n=37.
e. CU– CP–, n=39; CU+ CP–, n=37.
*P50.05, **P50.01.
Table 2 Psychiatric and autistic measure associations with callous–unemotional traits as rated by the Antisocial Process
Screening Device (APSD) (standardised)a
Emotional and behavioural problems
Unadjusted Adjusted for conduct problems
Adjusted for conduct problems
and autism severity
at 16 (parent-rated) b P b P b P
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire
Conduct problems 0.17 0.02 NA
Hyperactivity 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.38
Emotional symptoms 70.02 0.82 NA – NA –
Peer relations 0.30 50.01 0.28 0.01 0.28 0.03
Prosocial behaviour 70.50 50.001 70.51 50.001 70.50 50.001
Social responsiveness scale, total 4.78 50.001 4.70 50.001 NA –
a. Adjusted associations first account for the presence of conduct problems, and second for the presence of conduct problems and level of autism severity as rated by
ICD-10 symptom severity.
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ratio (OR)= 1.06, P=0.44) or difference scores on the Trail
Making task (b=0.11, P=0.30). Controlling for hyperactivity left
the pattern of results unchanged. Total scores by group are
displayed in Table 4. Correlations between callous–unemotional
traits and all neurocognitive measures are displayed in online
Tables DS2 and DS3.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first report of the prevalence,
psychiatric correlates and neurocognitive profile of callous–
unemotional traits within adolescents with ASD using a
population-based sample. We found that 51% scored in the top
6% for callous–unemotional traits, reflecting nearly a tenfold
increase over the general population.52,53 Our prevalence rate
is higher than that reported in a previous study of callous–
unemotional traits in a smaller, selected sample of young people
with ASD, which found 36% were ‘high’ in callous–unemotional
traits.26 The previous study used teacher-reported callous–
unemotional traits and ours parent-report; informant type could
be related to these differences. Both previous work and our results
suggest an increase in callous–unemotional traits in individuals
with ASD, compared with the general population. We also
demonstrated that callous–unemotional traits in adolescents with
ASD are associated with the same deficit in fear recognition
previously reported in typically developing samples.
Causes of the high prevalence
of callous–unemotional traits in ASD
There are two possible explanations for the remarkably high
prevalence of callous–unemotional traits in our sample of
adolescents with ASD. First, people with ASD may be at increased
risk of developing callous–unemotional traits. It may be that the
cognitive impairments associated with ASD increase the risk of
developing these traits. Second, the overlap could be as a result
of superficial similarity in behaviours, assessed on measures such
as the APSD, which may be in part tapping ASD characteristics,
leading to an artificial inflation of estimates of callous–
unemotional traits. Questionnaires measuring characteristics such
as empathy may fail to distinguish affective and cognitive
components, which some argue are distinct traits, and are
differentially associated with ASD and callous–unemotional
traits.22–24 As some behavioural characteristics associated with
callous–unemotional traits can be superficially similar to features
of ASD (such as lack of sensitivity to the feelings of others),
instruments designed to measure callous–unemotional traits in
typical populations may not be sensitive enough to discriminate
between overlapping aspects of ASD and callous–unemotional
traits (for example being able to identify v. caring about emotions
of others). However, as we found the specific deficit in fear
recognition difficulty associated with callous–unemotional traits
in non-ASD populations, we suggest that the APSD may be
sensitive enough to distinguish a meaningfully different subgroup
of individuals with ASD with additional callous–unemotional
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Table 3 Neurocognitive correlates of callous–unemotional traits as rated by the Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD):
scores and multivariate regression of callous-unemotional traits on emotional recognition and theory of mind tasks (standardised)
Group, mean (s.d.) Unadjusted test statistic Group, n
CU– CP– CU+ CP– CU+ CP+ F (d.f.) b P CU– CP– CU+ CP– CU+ CP+
Emotion recognition
Overall test of effect 1.44 (6,87) 0.21 40 36 8
Specific emotion 40 36 8
Happiness 9.88 (0.40) 9.94 (0.23) 9.38 (1.41) 70.01 0.71
Sadness 7.55 (2.37) 7.14 (1.94) 7.13 (0.64) 70.15 0.13
Fear 6.35 (2.65) 5.50 (2.85) 5.38 (2.00) 70.30 0.02
Anger 7.18 (1.93) 6.75 (1.87) 7.50 (1.93) 70.03 0.76
Surprise 8.30 (2.57) 8.50 (1.98) 7.50 (2.73) 70.11 0.32
Disgust 4.85 (3.04) 4.53 (2.97) 3.63 (1.77) 70.20 0.12
Theory of mind
Overall test of effect 0.63 (7,76) 0.73 41 38 8
Specific task
Strange Stories 0.76 (0.49) 0.98 (0.54) 0.50 (0.32) 0.01 0.86 37 34 7
Penny Hiding Errors 1.66 (0.73) 1.84 (0.82) 1.75 (0.89) 0.02 0.64 41 38 8
Frith–Happe´ animations 2.91 (1.07) 2.86 (0.87) 2.67 (0.86) 70.03 0.48 38 34 6
Combined First Order False Belief 1.71 (0.68) 1.68 (0.71) 1.50 (0.93) 70.00 0.86 41 37 8
Combined Second Order False Belief 1.71 (1.12) 1.59 (1.19) 1.63 (1.19) 70.03 0.53 41 37 8
Second Order False Belief 1.61 (0.93) 1.67 (0.78) 1.57 (0.98) 70.03 0.44 36 33 7
CP, conduct problems; CU, callous–unemotional traits.
Table 4 Neurocognitive correlates of callous–unemotional traits as rated by the Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD):






(n=8) b Odds ratio P
Trail making difference score, mean (s.d.) 7.22 (2.23) 7.21 (2.63) 7.21 (1.84) 0.11 0.30
Card sort trials to criterion, n 1.06 0.44
Top 50% 20 16 4
51–75% 9 12 0
76%+ 7 6 4
Did not meet criterion 5 2 0
CP, Conduct problems; CU, Callous–unemotional traits.
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traits. It would be interesting in future work to examine alexithymia
(impaired ability to reflect on and report own emotions) in this
subgroup, given recent evidence that emotion processing and
empathy deficits are a function of co-occurring alexithymia rather
than characteristics of ASD itself.54
Within our total sample of adolescents with ASD, 13% (12/92)
scored above a cut-off indicative of conduct problems. This rate is
similar to those reported in samples of typically developing
adolescents.51 Of the group classified as above cut-off for
callous–unemotional traits, only 17% displayed concurrent
conduct problems. This contrasts with general population
findings; in a community sample of 7- to 12-year-olds, those with
callous–unemotional traits showed a 0.95 probability of having
concomitant conduct problems, and only 0.2% of those with
these traits scored below cut-off for conduct problems.52 The
dissociation of callous–unemotional from conduct problems in
ASD may indicate a different cognitive underpinning.
Alternatively, the sociocognitive difficulties associated with ASD
may lead to reduced exposure to peers and prevent individuals
from engaging in the more socialised and peer-related aspects of
conduct-disordered behaviour.
Behavioural correlates of callous–unemotional
traits in ASD
Callous–unemotional traits were associated with an increase in
conduct problems, hyperactivity and peer problems, and a
decrease in prosocial behaviour. However, when conduct problems
were accounted for, the relationship between callous–unemotional
traits and hyperactivity became non-significant. Given the
conceptualisation of callous–unemotional traits as being in part
because of an inability to emotionally resonate with others, our
finding of increased callous–unemotional traits being associated
with difficulties in interpersonal functioning (as indexed by
increased peer problems and a decrease in prosocial behaviour)
was expected, and is in line with previous research.13,51 Our results
therefore provide some evidence for similar behavioural profiles
associated with callous–unemotional traits in individuals with
ASD, as in those without ASD.
Surface-level similarities in callous–unemotional traits and
ASD with respect to impairments in interpersonal functioning
may lead to certain behavioural problems being misinterpreted
as being solely because of ASD, whereas callous–unemotional
traits may also be driving this behaviour. Understanding of the
behavioural correlates of these traits in ASD may be vital to
unpicking the heterogeneous presentation of ASD. Although the
association of callous–unemotional traits with prosocial behaviour
and peer problems could be simply manifestations of more severe
ASD, we suggest this is not the case. When both conduct problems
and autism severity were accounted for, the relationships between
callous–unemotional traits and both prosocial behaviour and peer
problems remained, suggesting these traits selectively have an
impact on the presentation of ASD beyond difficulties driven by
autism severity.
Neurocognitive profile of callous–unemotional
traits in ASD
The present findings partially support the idea that the cognitive
correlates of callous–unemotional traits in people with ASD are
similar to those in the typically developing population, suggesting
a shared underlying aetiology. Those with callous–unemotional
traits and concurrent conduct problems had significantly lower
verbal and full-scale IQ than both those with callous–unemotional
traits alone and those scoring below threshold for both callous–
unemotional traits and conduct problems. This association is in
line with previous research.51 No differences were found between
individuals scoring below the callous–unemotional and conduct
problems threshold, or above the threshold for callous–
unemotional traits without conduct problems, suggesting the IQ
relationship is with conduct problems.
Previous literature also reports difficulties in the recognition
of fearful and sad emotions in children and adolescents with
psychopathic and callous–unemotional traits14,15 and individuals
with ASD with a history of offending.27 In line with our
predictions, our findings of a similar selective association between
callous–unemotional traits and fear recognition in adolescents
with ASD supports the idea of comparable disturbance in affective
domains, and subsequently similar aetiology of callous–
unemotional traits in individuals with and without ASD. Unlike
previous studies of callous–unemotional traits in individuals with
ASD,27 we did not find impairment in the recognition of sad faces;
this may have been because of decreased power within our sample.
We found no differences on any of the theory of mind tasks,
suggesting no additional impairment in cognitive domains asso-
ciated with callous–unemotional traits among individuals with
ASD, similar to previous findings.22,23 The lack of association
between callous–unemotional traits and theory of mind is unlikely
to be because of theory of mind task insensitivity, as all tasks aside
from the Second Order False Belief task showed a significant
relationship with at least one measure of autism severity (online
Table DS4). Our findings support a selective affective difficulty
but no sociocognitive difficulties, similar to that reported in
individuals with callous–unemotional traits without ASD.22–24
We found no association between callous–unemotional traits
and cognitive flexibility, consistent with previous findings in
ASD22,23 but different from those in the general population.18
Previous studies suggest associations between callous–unemotional
traits and measures of executive functioning may be driven by
comorbid ADHD,20 thus we accounted for hyperactivity within
our analyses. This did not change our results, suggesting
callous–unemotional traits may indeed present differently with
respect to cognitive flexibility when found in individuals with
ASD, however these findings require replication.
Strengths and limitations
Strengths of this study include use of a population-based sample
of adolescents with carefully characterised ASD. A wide range of
psychiatric and cognitive characteristics were assessed, including
many that have been previously related to callous–unemotional traits
in the typically developing population. This allowed us to explore
a range of variables involved in the presentation of callous–
unemotional traits, and the sample used suggests any conclusions
drawn regarding prevalence rates of callous–unemotional traits in
ASD and their psychiatric/cognitive correlates are likely to be
representative of the adolescent ASD population.
Limitations of the present study include the use of mainly
parent-reported questionnaires of behavioural symptoms,
including callous–unemotional traits; however the validity of
self-reported behavioural measures in the ASD population still
needs to be established. Behavioural items indexing callous–
unemotional traits on the APSD may overlap with ASD
symptoms, thus more sensitive measures of these traits in ASD
require development. Second, we did not have sufficient statistical
power to include a comparison group of typically developing
adolescents with which to compare our findings. Ideally, future
work would examine callous–unemotional traits in typically
developing samples compared with individuals with ASD matched
for intellectual level.
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Implications
Clinicians have been concerned that some people with ASD
appear to show high levels of callous–unemotional traits and the
present study supports this clinical impression for a subset of
individuals. However, callous–unemotional traits in individuals
with ASD are less strongly associated with conduct problems than
is the case in individuals without ASD. Therefore clinicians should
be sensitive to the differential behavioural correlates associated
with callous–unemotional traits in individuals with ASD, as
compared with other clinical groups. Parents, caregivers and other
people working with individuals with ASD may require specific
psychoeducation about these traits, which are often distressing
to others but are not necessarily a predictor of antisocial
behaviour.
The present findings partially support a shared aetiology of
callous–unemotional traits in people with ASD and the general
population as indexed by impairments in affective domains, but
also suggest differences, particularly in the realm of cognitive
flexibility. Further study of callous–unemotional traits from both
a behavioural and cognitive perspective in individuals with ASD
with and without conduct problems would clarify the role of these
traits in predisposing individuals to conduct problems and
antisocial behaviour.
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Unlike neurologists, affect not the brain is the object of psychiatrists’ specialist medical expertise. Defined as feelings, emotions and
agitations, affect integrates human responses and drives brain and body changes, thinking, perceiving, relating and acting. In
no particular order, it depends on genes, evolution, culture, physiology, personal experience, social history, chance, meaning,
the environment and a sense of self and others. Disturbance in any (combination) of these may lead to psychopathology,
the understanding and treatment of which demands biomedical training, empathic curiosity about the human soul, a pluralist
perspective, tolerance of anxiety and engagement with public perceptions, policies and ideologies.
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Data supplement to Carter Leno et al. Callous-unemotional traits in adolescents with autism 
spectrum disorder. Br J Psychiatry doi: 10.1192/bjp.bp.114.159863 
Online Supplement DS1 
Method 
Item Response Rates from the Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD) – callous-unemotional 
subscale (total count/percentage per item).  
Item scoring: 0 = not at all true, 1 = sometimes true or 2 = definitely true 
Question 3 ‘Cares about school work’ (reverse scored) 0 – 23/25% 1 – 45/48.9% 2 – 24/26.1% 
 
Question 7 ‘Good at keeping promises’ (reverse scored) 0 – 21/22.8% 1 – 50/54.4% 2 – 21/22.8%  
Question 12 ‘Feels bad when does something wrong’ (reverse scored) 0 – 27/29.3% 1 – 47/51.1% 2 – 18/19.6%  
Question 18 ‘Concerned about other’s feelings’ (reverse scored) 0 – 14/15.2% 1 – 51/55.4% 2 – 27/29.4% 
2 
 
Question 19 ‘Hides feelings from others’ 0 – 32/34.8% 1 – 52/56.5% 2 – 8/8.7%  
Question 20 ‘Keeps some friends’ (reverse scored) 0 – 37/40.2% 1 – 32/34.8% 2 – 23/25%  
Neurocognitive Tasks 
All tasks were programmed in Matlab v6.5 (Mathworks Inc., Sherbon, MA) using Cogent 2000 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, UCL Institute of Neurology, London, UK; http://vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/) and presented on a Hewlett Packard laptop computer with a 15” LCD display screen. For the verbal tasks, stimuli were delivered bi-aurally through headphones (Sennheiser HD 280 pro).  Most participants were tested in one of two quiet testing labs. For practical reasons, a minority were tested at home or at school in the best available testing space but always in a quiet 1:1 environment. Participants were positioned with their eye line approximately 50 cm from the screen. 
Emotion Recognition 
Ekman-Friesen Test.  The stimuli were black and white halftone photographs of male and female faces expressing six ‘basic’ emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, disgust). Each stimulus was displayed on the screen until the examiner had input the participant’s response. A total of 60 faces were presented, 10 of each emotion, in same order as 
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the original Ekman–Friesen test. The measured variable was total number of correctly identified emotions, this was calculated for each emotion separately and as a total overall score. 
Executive Functioning 
Card Sort task. For three trials, participants were shown a photograph of a character (e.g. Sally) and a pack of 64 cards with a separate character and pack of cards for each trial. The cards depicted single objects that varied on three dimensions: colour, shape and size. Participants were told that the character had some favourite cards and that it was their job to work out what those cards were; they were also shown four of the cards as exemplars. They were then instructed: “I will show you the cards one at a time and I will ask you if you think it is one of Sally’s favourite cards. There is a rule about which cards Sally likes best. I would like you to try to work out the rule and remember it.” The participant was informed that they would be told if they were correct or not. A counterbalanced ordering system was used to dictate the dimension on which the cards were sorted on each trial. The participant’s decision on the first trial was always taken as the correct one and the trial continued until the participant was correct on six consecutive sorts or after 20 trials. The measured variable was number of trials to correctly identify the set. 
Trail Making task. The task comprised three trials. For Part A1, the participant was asked to “join the dots” in numerical order of circles numbered 1-25. For Part A2, the participant was asked to “join the dots” in alphabetic order of circles labelled A-Y. For Part B1, the participant was asked to “join the dots” by switching between numbers (1-13) and letters (A-L) (i.e. 1-A-2-B-3-C and so on). For each trial, a short practice was initiated prior to the test. Time taken to complete each trial was recorded to the nearest millisecond. The subtraction of Part A1 from Part B served as a measure of switching ability.  
Theory of Mind  
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Strange Stories. This task required understanding of the effect of and motivation for double bluffs, misunderstanding, lies and persuasion. The participants were read a series of stories, which were also written out in front of them and accompanied by an appropriate illustration. Four of the stories had a ToM component, where the participant had to demonstrate understanding of the character’s thoughts, feelings and intentions, and two were control “physical” stories, which did not demand mental state understanding. The order of story presentation was counterbalanced. Following Bowler,47 a zero-one-two scoring system was implemented, with zero representing an incorrect or “don’t know” response and two representing a full and explicitly correct answer. The outcome variable was the average score from the four ToM stories. Thirty-two out of a possible 129 
scripts in the full dataset were selected and independently rated, with intraclass correlations coefficients 
of 0.91-0.98. 
Frith-Happé Animations. The task used six silent 2D animations that are part of an established set of mental state cartoons, and previously described procedures were followed (see Tregay et al,48, Reitan & Wolfson49 for further details). All featured two interacting ‘‘characters,’’ a big red triangle and a small blue triangle, moving within a white framed space.). The animations were matched as closely as possible for visual characteristics. The length of the animations averaged at 41 sec (SD 5 4.1 sec). Participants had to watch the animation and to describe what they thought the two triangles were doing, with their verbal response recorded for later transcription and scoring. Intentionality scores were calculated by scoring the degree of mental state attribution, with zero = no mental state language, i.e. describing a non-deliberate action, and five = sophisticated use of mental state language, i.e. describing deliberate action with goal of affecting mental state. Intraclass correlation coefficients between independent raters on 72 participants’ 
scores were between 0.82-0.98. 
Penny Hiding. The task began by the experimenter placing their hands behind their back to 
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hide a penny in one of their hands. They then produced their closed fists to show the participant and the participant was asked to guess which hand the penny was in. After their guess, the penny was revealed and the participant would learn whether they were correct or not. This was repeated a further five times, with a fixed order of hidden locations (right or left fist). After completion of this phase, the participant was told: "Now it's your turn.  See if you can trick me.  Hide it really well, just like I did". The participant was given six trials of hiding the penny. Each trial was coded as a pass or a fail, based on whether a participant deception error led the experimenter to explicitly know where the penny was. Separate coding of the types of deception errors was made (does not keep both hands out of sight when hiding the penny; only one hand used for either hiding or presenting; hand(s) are open; tells you where the penny is; display error (i.e. the penny is hidden but you can tell where it is e.g. by grip), with a total score calculated. It was possible to display more than one error on a trial. The task was scored on-line as much as was possible without disrupting the flow of the game, with a video recording of the session being used for additional scoring, as necessary. The outcome variable was the total number of errors across the session. 
Combined false belief story. Participants were read a story about two characters; Mary and John, whilst viewing cartoon depictions of the story. They were told that Mary and John hide some chocolate in the kitchen fridge but whilst Mary was outside, John removes the chocolate and places it in his bag. The first order false belief question asks: “Where does Mary think the chocolate is?”. The participant is also asked a justification question (“Why does Mary think the chocolate is in the _____?”) and a control question (“Where has John put the chocolate really?”). For the second order part of the story, the participant is told that when John was hiding the chocolate Mary saw him from the kitchen window, but that John did not see Mary looking. The second order false belief question asks: “Where does John think Mary will look for the chocolate?”. The participant is also asked is also asked a justification question (“Why does John think Mary will look for the chocolate in the _____?”) 
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and three control questions (“Did John see Mary watching him through the window?”; “Where is the chocolate really?”; “Where was the chocolate first of all?”). The outcome variables were performance on the first order part of the story and performance on the second order part of the story. 
 Second Order False Belief. Participants listened to the experimenter reading a story about two characters, Peter and Jane, who visit two shops at lunchtime to find Peter a new coat; they identify a preferred coat in one of the shops and plan to purchase it that evening. Later that day, both characters independently discover that the coat Peter had wanted to purchase has sold out. The participants are tested on their understanding of Jane’s second order false belief that Peter will have gone to the shop they had both planned to go to, and not to the other shop (“Where does Jane think Peter has gone to buy his coat?”). This is followed by a justification question (“Why?”), reality question (“Where has Peter really gone to buy his coat?”) and memory question (“In which shop did Peter see the coat he liked the best?”). A series of basic prompt questions to ensure comprehension were included earlier in the story. A full transcript of the story can be found in Moffit & Silva.51 







Table DS1 Correlations between psychiatric and autistic measure associations and callous-unemotional traits 
 CU trait 
score 
Emotional and behavioural 
problems at 16 (parent-rated) 
 











Table DS2 Correlations between tasks of emotional recognition and Theory of Mind and callous-unemotional traits 
 CU trait score 
Ekman emotional face 
recognition task 
 
Total Score -.25* Happiness -.04 Sadness -.16 Fear -.26* Anger -.03 Surprise -.11 Disgust -.17 






Table DS3 Correlations between tasks of executive functioning (response reversal and attention switching) and callous-unemotional traits 
 CU trait score Trail Making Difference Score 0.12 Card Sort Total Sorts Required 0.05 
 
Table DS4 Correlations between ToM tasks and autism severity, as measured by the SRS and ICD-10 clinician ratings of symptom severity 
ToM task SRS Total ICD-10 Symptom 
Severity Strange Stories -.18 -.21* Penny Hiding Errors .20* .34** Castelli Animations -.09 -.31** Combined 1st Order False Belief -.19* -.21* Combined 2nd Order False Belief -.19* -.03 2nd Order False Belief -.06 -.05 SRS Social responsiveness scale * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 
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